This paper investigates the semantics of English only and two equivalent expressions in Japanese -dake and -shika, giving attention to two aspects: (i) the debate over the status of two propositions that are involved in the use of ONLY expressions and (ii) the semantic and pragmatic differences among ONLY items, if any. We claim that a sentence with ONLY expressions entails both the affirmative and negative propositions. This view raises issues with Horn's original claim (1969) as well as van Rooij and Schulz's (2005) while supporting Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 and Horn (2002). We claim then that the difference in strength between the affirmative and negative propositions emerges from what is asserted by that sentence. One of the bases for our claim is that there is a significant difference in behavior between entailment and assertion of a given sentence, following Horn (2002). This difference explains the difference between -dake on the one hand and -shika and -only on the other: -dake differs from only and -shika in that it asserts the affirmative proposition while -shika and only asserts the negative proposition.
Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the semantics of English only and two equivalent expressions in Japanese -dake and -shika. We focus on two aspects, (i) the debate over the status of two propositions that are involved in the use of ONLY expressions and (ii) the semantic difference between -dake and -shika. Discussing the issue of the sentence involving ONLY expression, we examine a sentence such as (1) involving two propositions given in (2).
(1) Only John came.
(2) a.
John came.
(positive proposition) b.
No one else other than John came.
(negative proposition) Horn's (1969) classical analysis of English only proposed that while (1) asserts the exclusive negative proposition in (2b), it only presupposes the positive proposition in (2a). This view has been challenged by Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 , arguing that the positive proposition in (2a) is also conveyed by (1) and it is not merely a presupposition. We support Atlas' point that sentences containing ONLY expressions definitely entail the positive proposition and cannot be denied. Further, we claim that the asymmetry of the positive proposition and the negative proposition is due to its asserted content. We appeal to the difference between assertion and entailment to explain the claimed difference between the use ofdake and -shika. Namely, we argue that with Englih only and Japanese -shika, the negative proposition (2b) is asserted by the sentence (1) while the positive proposition (2a) is merely entailed by it. On the contrary, a sentence using -dake asserts the positive proposition while it only entails the negative proposition. This position follows the later work by Horn (2002) in some respect where he describes the difference between assertion and entailment for almost and barely. However, we disregard his notion of "assertoric inertia," which states that the entailed content can be suppressed for NPI licensing purposes. This optionality of "assertoric inertia" is very problematic, especially in crosslinguistic data and we do not support his idea that the entailed material, namely the positive proposition in (2a), becomes assertorically inert. One of the implications of our claim is that ONLY expressions do not license NPIs and that the licensing property of English only is not a crosslinguistic phenomenon. The fact that English only allows some NPIs has to be explained in some other way besides "assertoric inertia" (Giannakidou 2006 ). Further, we claim that the semantic difference between -dake and -shika is not only in their asserted content but also in their semantic representations. In order to explain the interpretation of -shika, we invoke its semantic similarity to English exceptives, i.e. but-phrases as in "Everybody but John came." Therefore, a sentence such as (1) with -shika can be interpreted as "Everyone but John did not come." The difference from exceptives would be that while but-phrases have to combine with universal quantifiers, -shika does not and it itself introduces a universal quantifier. The item then takes scope over the negation, yielding the desired interpretation. We employ the idea of Domain Subtraction (von Fintel 1993) to represent the semantics of -shika. This analysis allows for a natural explanation for the data where it illustrates a null pronoun picking up the entities "everyone but John," instead of "John."
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the Japanese data, illustrating the kind of examples we investigate as well as the NPI nature ofshika. In section 3, we discuss Horn's classical analysis, pointing out his arguments for the presuppositional and asymmetrical approach. We argue against this approach by illustrating that the evidence he provides is unreliable. Additional data are given to support the position that the positive proposition is not only presupposed but must be entailed. Section 4 provides our proposal. We first illustrate the difference between -dake and -shika, observed by Kuno (1999) , which gives a support for asymmetrical status of the two propositions involved. We then show that the asymmetrical status of the two propositions is best explained by the difference between assertion and entailment. We incorporate Horn's (2002) analysis of almost and barely. In section 5, we discuss the semantics of -shika as an exceptive. Section 6 summarizes the results and our claims.
Data and the issues
The relevant examples from Japanese involve two distinct lexical items -dake and -shika, the latter being a negative polarity item (NPI). The counterpart of (1) would be (3) and (4) below, where both particles attach to the noun phrase.
(3) John-dake ki-ta John-DAKE come-PAST "Only John came." (4) John-shika ko-nak-atta John-SHIKA come-NEG-PAST "Only John came. (=Everyone but John didn't come)."
As you can see, -shika is accompanied by a negation marker -nai to convey the same meaning. Without it, it becomes ungrammatical as in (5).
(5) *John-shika ki-ta John-SHIKA come-PAST "(Intended meaning) Only John came."
Unlike some English polarity sensitive items, such as any and ever, this item is not licensed in questions or conditionals, illustrating that it is an NPI in a very strict sense. *John-ga (moshi) mizu-shika non-dara, yaseru-daroo John-NOM (if) water-SHIKA drink-COND lose.weight-be.will "If John drinks only water, he'll lose weight."
The licensing condition for this item has been studied intensively within syntactic frameworks (Oyakawa 1975; Muraki 1978; Konomi 1989; Aoyagi and Ishii 1994; Kuno 1999) , esp. the issues of structural relationship between -shika and -nai. This paper will not address these issues and only the semantics of -shika in monoclausal cases will be discussed. Please refer to the works above for more information. Contrasting -shika, -dake is not polarity sensitive at all, being compatible with negation and other operators.
(7) a.
John-dake ko-nak-atta John-DAKE come-NEG-PAST "Only John didn't come." b.
John-dake mi-ta no? John-DAKE see-PAST Q "Did (you) see only John? (or Did only John see?)" c.
John-ga (moshi) mizu-dake non-dara, yaseru-daroo John-NOM (if) water-DAKE drink-COND lose.weight-be.will "If John drinks only water, he'll lose weight."
The relevant data for this paper are (3) and (4). As noted earlier, the general consensus for English only was that a sentence containing only involves two propositions. For Japanese, that is also the case for both particles. Therefore, (3) and (4) roughly convey the two propositions given in (2), repeated here again.
John came. b.
One of the goals here is to clarify how (1), (3) and (4) convey the propositions given in (2). This relates to the long-standing discussion of what is asserted in the sentences containing ONLY. Another goal is to explain the difference betweendake and -shika. While it is not clear from simple cases such as a comparison between (3) and (4), there is a clear difference in use between the two. Kuno (1999) The sentence starts out with a purpose phrase followed by what Kuno (1999) refers to as "S-reba ii" construction, translated as "it's all right as long as S." As you can see, -dake is perfect in this context while -shika becomes weird. Notice also that if the items were to be replaced with English only in the translation, it aligns withshika. Namely, (9) is a weird statement.
(9) #In order to make an around-the-world trip, it is all right as long as (you) speak only English. We come back to explain these cases in section 4.
Before we move on to the previous analysis of ONLY expressions, let us clarify what kind of effects ONLY has on a sentence. The use of ONLY unmistakably changes what the sentence asserts and conveys. That is, there is a truth conditional difference and difference in assertion between (1) and (11).
(1) Only John came to the meeting. (11) John came to the meeting.
While both sentences seem to convey that John came, given a context where John and Mary came to the meeting, (11) is true while (1) becomes false. That is because (11) only asserts that John came and says nothing about other people. On the contrary, the use of only in (1) additionally asserts that no other people came, which becomes incompatible with the given context where Mary also came. This is significantly different from other focus particles such as EVEN, which does not affect the truth condition of the sentence. In the following, we discuss Horn's (1969) initial approach to analyze these meanings and break down his arguments one by one to illustrate that they do not hold. In so doing, we argue against his presuppositional analysis and claim that the tests actually give evidence that the positive proposition is indeed entailed. Horn (1969) claims that the assertion of the sentence containing only is simply the negative proposition and that the positive proposition is only presupposed. Namely, his proposal is the following.
Problems with Presupposition approach: positive proposition is entailed!
(12) Only a P.
a. Asserts:
He supports this asymmetrical approach with numerous facts, most of which have been discredited by Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 . Following Atlas' work, we take up on three of them with additional Japanese data to illustrate the same point: NPI licensing of ONLY, cancellability of the positive proposition and negative answers to yes/no questions.
NPI licensing: ONLY does not license NPIs
One of the facts Horn (1969) used was the NPI licensing property of only. The so-called negative polarity items, any, ever and minimizers, which are ungrammatical in positive context, become acceptable with the presence of only as illustrated below.
(13) a.
*Young writers ever accept suggestions with any sincerity. b.
Only young writers ever accept suggestions with any sincerity. (14) a.
*John lifted a finger to help the children. b.
Only John lifted a finger to help the children.
This data is used to argue that the contribution of only is solely the negative proposition as given in (12a) where the negation licenses the NPIs. He maintains the position that (12b) is only presupposed and is not a part of the truth conditional semantics of the sentence. As already noted by Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 and Giannakidou (2006) , this position cannot be defended. The examples in (b) below illustrate that -dake cannot license the NPIs, dare-mo "anyone," ichido-mo "once," and zenzen, "at all."
(15) a. John-wa dare-mo mi-nak-atta John-TOP who-mo see-NEG-PAST "Only John saw anyone." b.
*John-dake dare-mo mita John-DAKE who-mo saw "(Intended meaning) Only John saw anyone." (16) a.
John-wa sensei-ni ichido-mo awa-nak-atta John-TOP teacher-DAT once-mo see-NEG-PAST "John didn't see the teacher even once." b.
*John-dake sensei-ni ichido-mo atta John-DAKE teacher-DAT once-mo saw "(Intended meaning) Only John saw the teacher even once." (17) a.
John-wa sensei-ni zenzen awa-nak-atta John-TOP teacher-DAT at.all see-NEG-PAST "John didn't see the teacher at all." b.
*John-dake sensei-ni zenzen atta John-DAKE teacher-DAT at.all saw "(Intended meaning) Only John saw the teacher at all." Giannakidou (2006) also illustrates the same point with Greek and Spanish data. Note that -shika cannot be used for this test since it itself requires negation marker as the ungrammaticality of (11a) shows. Once we add negation marker as in (11c) Nobody wrote a letter to his mother. Nobody wrote a letter to his father either. b.
Nobody other than John wrote a letter to his mother. Nobody other than John wrote a letter to his father either. c.
Only John wrote a letter to his mother. *Only John wrote a letter to his father either.
If a sentence containing only truly asserts the negative proposition and entails nothing else, it should be able to license these items in the similar manner as the negative exceptives given in (b) examples. However, they don't. This is an indication that ONLY is a veridical operator in the sense of Giannakidou (1999) Giannakidou (2006) , that the acceptability of these items must be explained in some other way besides its (non)veridicality and licensing. The important point here is that ONLY expressions in general are not nonveridical and they do not license NPIs. 
Cancellability: the positive proposition is not cancellable
Another factor Horn (1969) employs in order to illustrate the presuppositional status of the positive proposition is its cancellability. 3 The test is that if something is not entailed, it must be cancellable without contradiction. Van Rooij and Schulz (2005) also give similar examples to support their position that the positive proposition is not entailed.
(21) a.
Only Kim can pass the test, but it's possible even she can't. b.
#Only Kim can pass the test, but it's possible that someone else can.
At first sight, there seems to be a significant difference in cancellability between the negative and positive propositions. Namely, the positive proposition is cancelled without contradiction while the denial of the negative proposition results in anomaly. However, as later noted by Horn (2002) himself, once we take out epistemic rider, the judgment significantly changes as seen in (22). (22) #Only Kim passed the test, and/but it's possible even she didn't. b.
#Only Kim passed the test, and/but it's possible that someone else did.
Similarly, once the sentence is episodic, the positive proposition cannot be cancelled without being contradictory as seen in (23). The same results hold for both -dake and -shika. The counterpart of (23) is given below.
(24) John-dake ano mondai-o toi-ta "Only John solved that problem… John-DAKE that problem-ACC solve-PAST a.
#demo John-mo tok-a-nak-atta kanousei-ga aru but John-also solve-NEG-PAST possibility-NOM exist ...but it's possible that even John did not solve." b.
#demo hokano-hito-mo toi-ta kanousei-ga aru but other-person-also solve-PAST possibility-NOM exist …but it's possible that someone else also solved." (25) John-shika ano mondai-o tok-anak-atta "Only John solved that problem… John-SHIKA that problem-ACC solve-NEG-PAST a.
#demo John-mo tok-a-nak-atta kanousei-ga aru but John-also solve-NEG-PAST possibility-NOM exist …but it's possible that even John did not solve." b.
#demo hokano-hito-mo toi-ta kanousei-ga aru but other-person-also solve-PAST possibility-NOM exist …but it's possible that someone else also solved."
Both the negative and positive propositions cannot be cancelled without causing contradiction in either -dake or -shika. This result decisively illustrates that the positive proposition is also entailed by a sentence containing ONLY expressions.
One thing that is peculiar is the asymmetry we observed in (21). The counterpart of (21)-except for the name change-is given below with -dake in (26) and with -shika in (27).
(26) John-dake ano mondai-ga tok-eru "Only John can solve that problem… John-DAKE that problem-NOM solve-can a.
#demo John-mo tok-e-nai kanousei-ga aru but John-also solve-can-NEG possibility-NOM exist ...but it's possible that even John cannot solve." b.
(?)demo hokano-hito-mo tok-eru kanousei-ga aru but other-person-also solve-can possibility-NOM exist …but it's possible that someone else also can." (27) John-shika ano mondai-ga tok-e-nai "Only John can solve that problem… John-SHIKA that school-DAT pass-can-NEG a.
?? demo John-mo tok-e-nai kanousei-ga aru but John-also solve-can-NEG possibility-NOM exist …but it's possible that John also cannot solve." b.
?? demo hokano-hito-mo tok-eru kanousei-ga aru but other-person-also solve-can possibility-NOM exist …but it's possible that someone else also can."
The judgment for (27) with -shika is very shaky with all the speakers I have consulted. Generally they did not like the denials of both propositions to a certain extent but they could not tell if they were a complete contradiction. This illustrates the unreliability of the test itself. Interestingly, however, there was a significant judgment difference in the -dake cases. Many agree that the denial of the positive proposition results in contradiction whereas the denial of the negative proposition does not result in complete contradiction. At least they seemed to like (26b) better than (26a). This indicates that -dake shows the opposite behavior of only in the strength of the two propositions conveyed. Recall the judgment of (21) with only which gave the opposite result. While this test is not reliable, we cannot deny the fact that it picks out some aspect of the difference in the strengths of these two propositions involved. In section 4, we attempt to incorporate this difference in our analysis, using the distinction between assertion and entailment.
Answers to yes/no questions
The last thing we examine is one of the classic tests to determine presupposition. If there is a presupposition in yes/no question, answering the question with a negative answer will preserve the presupposed content. Therefore, the negative answer cannot negate the presupposed content without anomaly. To illustrate, Horn (1969) gives the following data. Somebody else did too but I forgot who. c. *She didn't. d.
*The election never took place.
According to Horn (1969) , both the answers (28c) and (28d) result in anomaly because they negate the presupposition of the question (28). We received a mixed result on this point. Some speakers agree with this judgment and some disagree.
Speakers who disagreed said that (28c) might not have the same "great" status as (28a) and (28b) but it was still perfectly accepted as a negative answer to (28) while (28d) was not. Clearly, for them, the division was between (28a)-(28c) versus (28d). That is exactly the responses we received for Japanese data below.
(29) John-dake miitingu-ni i-tta no? iie, John-DAKE meeting-DAT go-PAST Q? no "Did only John go to the meeting? No…" a.
Akira-mo itta "Akira also went." b.
hokano-hito-mo itta "Other people went too." c.
John-mo ika-nak-atta "John also didn't." d.
miitingu-wa nakuna-tta noyo "The meeting was cancelled." (30) John-shika miitingu-ni ika-nak-atta no? iie, John-SHIKA meeting-DAT go-NEG-PAST Q? no "Did only John go to the meeting? No…" a. Akira-mo itta "Akira also went." b.
miitingu-wa nakuna-tta noyo "The meeting was cancelled."
Japanese speakers were a little more lax about the acceptability of these answers and said that they were all "acceptable" as answers. However, the division was clear in that the status of (c) answers were far better than (d) answers and that (a)-(c) lined up together as "answering" the question rather than merely "responding'"to it. These judgment discrepancies in both English and Japanese again put the argument for the presupposition status of the positive proposition into question. In fact, the very distinct judgments for (c) and (d) suggest that the positive proposition is not just presupposed. One thing to note again is that all speakers agreed on the "perfect" status of (a) and (b) answers as negative answers as opposed to the slightly less preferred ones in (c). Again, we follow up on this slight difference in the next section. In this section, we spelled out Horn's supporting points and illustrated that they are all problematic to illustrate the presupposition status of the positive proposition. We then used the same data along with additional Japanese data to illustrate that the positive proposition is in fact entailed.
Proposed analysis
4.1. -dake vs. -shika; more positive vs. more negative
In the earlier section, we have provided evidence that the positive proposition must be entailed rather than merely presupposed. We have also observed that that is also the case for both -dake and -shika. Here we come back to the data by Kuno (1999) given in section 2 where -dake and -shika behaved differently. The examples (8) and (10) Given these two sets of data, we mentioned that the unacceptability of -shika in (8) and -dake in (10) cannot be due to its distributional restriction in this particular construction. As observed in (10), -shika becomes perfectly fine with S-reba ii construction as long as there is nothing wrong pragmatically with the semantics of -shika. As apparent from the translation, the difference is best captured if -dake is interpreted as simply carrying the positive proposition while -shika carrying only the negative proposition. 5 Kuno (1999) then analyzes this difference by stating that -dake primarily asserts its affirmative proposition and only secondarily asserts the negative one whereas -shika primarily asserts it negative proposition and only secondarily asserts the affirmative one. His analysis successfully captures the generalization, however, only descriptively. It is not clear semantically what it means by "primary assertion" as opposed to "secondary assertion." What is clear from the data above and Kuno's descriptive analysis is the fact that the positive 5 We also noted in section 2 that in the same context, English only lines up with -shika, illustrating that its negative aspect is "stronger."
proposition is "stronger" in -dake, thus felt to be more "positive," while the negative proposition is "stronger" in -shika, thus felt to be more "negative." We know that the positive proposition is entailed by the use of both particles so the question is how one is emphasized while the other is suppressed.
We propose that the asymmetrical statuses of these two propositions are explained by the distinction between entailment and assertion, following Horn's (2002) . This analysis allows us to maintain the result of the investigation that the positive proposition is entailed while explaining the slight difference in strength between the positive and negative propositions we observed earlier. In the following, we explain the contrast between assertion and entailment, partially based on Horn's (2002) analysis of almost and barely, extending to only. We show that for -dake, the positive proposition illustrates the property of assertion while for -shika and only it is the negative proposition that illustrates that property. We also make it clear that our analysis does not depend on Horn's idea of "assertoric inertia." In fact, we claim that this notion cannot be implemented with the Japanese data and still maintain that NPI licensing property of only does not involve the "suppressing" of the positive proposition.
Assertion vs. Entailment
The distinction between assertion and entailment is motivated in Horn (2002) in order to analyze the distinction between almost and barely. The relevant data is given below.
(31) Gore almost won. a. Positive: Gore "came close to" winning. b.
Negative: Gore did not win.
(entailed) (32) Bush barely won. a. Negative: Bush "came close to" not winning. b.
Positive: Bush won.
Undoubtedly, the entailed propositions are the ones given in (b). However, the general observation is that almost is felt to be more "positive" while barely more "negative." The following data illustrate this intuition.
(33) a. Good news: My printer is almost functional! b. Bad news: My printer is barely functional.
Interestingly, the same kind of difference is observed between -dake and -shika. With the -dake cases, the results are almost reverse, indicating that the positive proposition is unquestionably asserted. The counterpart of (36) is given in (39).
Since it is pragmatically odd to judge the embedded proposition as a bad thing (because the interpretation is the one given in (39i)), additional factives "it is good that" and "learn" are given in (40) and (41) respectively.
(39) Ie no roon-dake zeikin menjo nano-wa zannenna koto-da Home of loan-DAKE tax exempt COMP-TOP regretful thing-COP "It's too bad (regretful) that only home loans are tax-deductible." (i) "It's too bad that home loans are tax-deductible." (ii)
"?It's bad that no other loans besides home loans are taxdeductible." (40) Ie no roon-dake zeikin menjo nano-wa ii koto-da Home of loan-DAKE tax exempt COMP-TOP good thing-COP "It's good that only home loans are tax-deductible." (i) "It's good that home loans are tax-deductible." (ii) "?It's good that no other loans besides home loans are taxdeductible." (41) John-wa ie no roon-dake zeikin menjo da to ima shi-tta John-TOP home of loan-DAKE tax exempt COP COMP now know-PAST "John just learned that only home loans are tax-deductible." (i) "John just learned that home loans are tax-deductible." (ii) "?John just learned that no other loans are besides home loans are tax-deductible."
As indicated with a question mark, the result of -dake is not as crystal clear as the cases with only and -shika. It is not obvious if all the examples can be interpreted as indicated in (ii) for each case. What it means is that if it can be interpreted as (ii), the negative proposition is also asserted as well as the positive one. If it cannot, then it indicates that the negative proposition is entailed but not asserted. From what we have seen in the diagnostics, it is clear that only and -shika assert the negative proposition while entailing the positive proposition. Withdake, the results suggested a slight asymmetry between the two, however, the judgments were less decisive with respect to the status of the negative proposition, whether it is simply entailed or actually asserted. So far, our proposal can be summarized as below.
(42) Only P and -shika P  asserts the negative proposition  entails (but does not assert) the affirmative proposition (43) -dake P  asserts the positive proposition.  entails (and possibly asserts) the negative proposition This analysis has numerous advantages. It does not assume the complete semantic equivalence between -dake and -shika (Numata 1986 (Numata , 1992 and explains the difference more formally. Specifically, the differences observed in (8), (10), and (34) are accounted for. Crosslinguistically, it offers a new insight that -dake differs significantly from only while -shika behaves exactly like only. It also maintains the position that the positive proposition is entailed, indicating that ONLY is a veridical operator. The implication from this is that the acceptability of polarity sensitive items such as any, ever and minimizers with only should not be seen as the same phenomenon as other NPI licensing seen crosslinguistcally, as suggested by Giannakidou (2006 
Against the "assertoric inertia"
One of the goals for Horn (2002) Positive: Bush won.
The issue is that even though (31) entails the negative proposition (31b), almost does not license polarity items. In contrast, barely licenses them although (32) entails the positive proposition. Essentially, what this allows us to do is to suppress certain entailed proposition so as to allow NPI licensing. In the case of only, it means that we make the positive proposition "transparent" so that any, ever and minimizers are licensed. This is an extremely vague notion since it is not clear when some entailed material can become "assertorically inert." More problematic is the crosslinguistic data where it is clearly illustrated that ONLY expressions do not license NPIs. We maintain that the licensing of NPIs is not a general property of ONLY expressions crosslinguistically, thus maintaining the position that the positive proposition is always entailed and that ONLY is a veridical operator. Please refer to Giannakidou (2006) for more critique and a broader analysis of these cases.
Semantics of -shika and exceptives
Now we would like to turn our attention to the item -shika and illustrate its uniqueness as an item semantically very similar to exceptives. The similarity between ONLY and exceptives such as but-phrases is apparent. The analysis of exceptives is extensive (Hoeksema 1987; von Fintel 1993; Moltmann 1995 ) but here we follow von Fintel's (1993) analysis for convenience. In exceptive construction, we have to be concerned with a general restriction on the NPs with which an exception phrase may associate, i.e. it must combine with universal quantifiers. Such concern does not apply to our cases since it does not have to combine with any particular (at least not overtly) universals. Thus, for the semantics of -shika, we propose that it itself introduces a universal quantifier. We appeal to the notion of "domain restriction" (von Fintel 1993) to obtain the universally quantified set minus the set of entities picked out by -shika. The required negation then takes narrow scope with respect to this universal quantifier resulting in the desired interpretation, i.e. "Everyone but John did not come." The difference from the semantics of exceptives, as mentioned before, is that -shika itself comes with a universal quantifier instead of having to combine with it. The proposed semantics thus is what is given in (48).
An interesting parallel we can draw from this, once we extract the domain subtraction part, is the semantics of negative concord items. Relying on the theory of negative concord, you introduce either two negative elements and erase one (Watanabe 2004) or introduce the n-word as a universal quantifier which then gets wide scope with respect to the negation marker on the predicate (Giannakidou 2000) . The semantics of -shika can be seen as very much like the n-word in the latter approach.
What motivates this exceptive analysis of -shika is the possible referent of the null pronoun. Kuno (1999) observes that -dake marked NP can serve as a referent of the following null pronoun (49a) while -shika marked NP cannot (50a).
(49) Taro i -dake ikinokotta Taro-DAKE survived "Only Taro i survived." a.  Fuyu no soobi-o shiteita kara da winter's gear-ACC was.doing because be "It was because  i (Taro) had winter gear." b.
?? Fuyu no soobi-o shitei-nak-atta kara da winter's gear-ACC was.doing because be "It was because  (they) did not have winter gear." (50) Taro i -shika ikinokora-nak-atta Taro-SHIKA survive didn't "No one but Taro survived. (=Everyone but Taro survived)" a. ?? i Fuyu no soobi-o shiteita kara da winter's gear-ACC was.doing because copula "It was because  i (Taro) had winter gear." b.
 j Fuyu no soobi-o shitei-nak-atta kara da winter's gear-ACC was.doing because be "It was because  j (they) did not have winter gear." Conversely, the null pronoun cannot pick up the rest of the people like its referent in the case of -dake (49b) but it can in the case of -shika (50b). Our proposed semantics of -shika can account for these data naturally. The set "everyone but Taro" can be picked up by the null pronoun because it is introduced via the semantics given in (48) as a discourse topic. It also captures Kuno's observation that the sentence (50) is not about Taro but about "everyone else but Taro."
Conclusions
This paper started out with two related missions. One dealt with the question "what does a sentence containing ONLY expressions assert and entail?" The other dealt with two specific items in Japanese, -dake and -shika, and their differences. We clearly illustrated the invalidity of the presuppositional status of the positive proposition and showed that it is undeniably entailed with all ONLY expressions we looked at. In the process, we have also shown that due to the nature of its entailment, ONLY does not license NPIs. Consequently, we supported the idea that English any, ever and minimizers are a special case which had to be analyzed differently from other NPIs. We also clarified that we do not support Horn's (2002) notion of "assertoric inertia" due to its stipulative nature. It is simply not suitable for accounting for this fact because it unnecessarily forces the entailed content to be "transparent" just for NPI-licensing purposes.
Our proposal relied on the difference between assertion and entailment refined in Horn (2002) . Based on the difference we observed between -dake on the one hand and -shika and only on the other, we claimed that -dake sentences assert the positive proposition while -shika and only sentences assert the negative proposition, simultaneously entailing the positive proposition. It naturally captured the "affirmative" flavor of -dake and "negative" or "adverse" flavor of -shika and only. We further explicated the semantics of -shika as a universal quantifier, taking wide scope with respect to the negation, utilizing the analysis given for exceptives and referring to the similarity to the n-words in negative concord phenomena. pragmatics and comparative semantics. She is co-editor of Papers from the 38 th Annual Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society (2002) and author of several publications on focus and polarity in Japanese and English.
